The general attitude towards Arthur Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is rather fiercely critical and at times even tendentious. It seems that the figure of Schopenhauer as an irredeemably flawed, stubborn, and contradictory philosopher serves as a leitmotiv among scholars. Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will continues to be a thorny puzzle in the secondary literature, and it presents perhaps the greatest challenge to Schopenhauer scholars. Schopenhauer borrows the term ‘thing-in-itself’ from Immanuel Kant, who uses it to refer to a reality (...) that is distinct from what appears to us, and hence unknowable. Despite the fact that several interpretations have been offered to make sense of Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will, there appears to be no consensus about how to interpret this identification as well as his understanding of the term ‘thing-in-itself’. Unlike the other interpretations, the interpretation that I offer here distinguishes between three distinct and mutually incompatible views that Schopenhauer formulates about the thing-in-itself. I argue that it is not only difficult to give a coherent, consistent account of Schopenhauer’s position, but also not worth trying, because such an endeavor comes at the cost of ignoring the textual richness and depth of thought that Schopenhauer’s works offer. (shrink)

Nietzsche is known for his penetrating critique of Mitleid. He seems to be critical of all compassion but at times also seems to praise a different form of compassion, which he refers to as “our compassion” and contrasts it with “your compassion”. Some commentators have interpreted this to mean that Nietzsche’s criticism is not as unconditional as it may seem – that he does not condemn compassion entirely. I disagree and contend that even though Nietzsche appears to speak favorably of (...) some forms of compassion, he regards the nature of all compassion to be fundamentally bad. Furthermore, I suggest that Nietzsche’s discussion on different forms of compassion have significant implications for achieving greatness and meaning in life. More specifically, I argue that, for Nietzsche, “our compassion,” however regrettable qua compassion it is, may give occasion for a rare and peculiar insight into “co-suffering” with others, which in turn results in overcoming compassion entirely. I also argue that although Nietzsche objects to compassion, he approves of a form of what feminist theorists might now call “anticipatory empathy.” Even though a large body of literature has evolved over Nietzsche’s critical evaluation of compassion, his understanding of a non-compassionate response to suffering is, in my view, rather overlooked and should receive more attention. (shrink)

Is uncertainty, often brought about by loss, collapse, interruption, or disturbance in life, an entirely negative state that must be resolved as soon and as fully as possible by resettlement? Or, can we view uncertainty and loss as affective states that might open up new possibilities for friendships, solidarities, collectivities, and hope? As a response to Carla J. Maier’s ‘The Table and the Dancer’ this essay attends to affective and emotional registers of migration. It attempts to rethink the senses of (...) loss, uprootedness, and uncertainty as possible sources for affinities and hope, with a particular focus on the new migration from Turkey. (shrink)

Emerged as a movement within the evangelical wing of Protestantism in the 20th century, Pentecostal Christianity is a mystical religious movement that seeks holiness in a purely individual experience and emphasizes spiritual unity. This movement, assumed an important role in spreading Christianity to the world is claimed to be the second largest group after Roman Catholicism with its different discourse and organization structure. Its mystical aspect, especially affects churches in the northern hemisphere as well as the southern hemisphere and the (...) movement's activities are considered a harvest of new souls collected by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, this situation raises the question of what is the place of the movement within the Christian unity. For this reason, it is important to examine the participation of the movement in the issues of ecumenical unity since its emergence in the North of America.This article aims to reveal the relationship between Pentecostal Christianity and the global ecumenical movement and tends to provide a way of thinking about ecumenism encouraging Pentecostal participation in the ecumenical mission. Although Pentecostal movement defined as an ecumenical spirit has shown a negative attitude towards formal ecumenical processes in the early period, it has recently changed the way of approaching regional and international ecumenical negotiations. The aim of bilateral dialogues between Pentecostals and other historical churches seems to be on developing mutual respect and understanding rather than structural unity. The next will show whether these visible associations for now will become a realistic dialogue goal that includes structural unity in the future, or to form a spiritually invisible unity that moves freely in spirit without the need for a structural unity. (shrink)

This study focuses on why some companies in developing countries go beyond environmental regulations when implementing their corporate environmental social responsibilities or citizenship behavior. Drawing mainly upon the new institutional theory, this study develops a conceptual framework to explain three institutional factors: companies’ market orientations, industrial characteristics, and corporate identities. Accordingly, we suggest that companies from developing countries that are oriented to markets in developed countries, operate in highly concentrated industries, and have missionary identities adopt corporate environmental citizenship behavior by (...) going beyond environmental regulations. The study also discusses the theoretical, policy, and managerial implications of the conceptual framework. (shrink)

As research on ethical consumers and consumption practices has continued to grow, a complimentary body of work concerned less with ethical consumption but more with ethics in consumption has emerged. Problematizing the divide between ethical and non-ethical consumption, this stream of research focuses on the domain of everyday and explores the moral struggles individuals face while engaging in ordinary consumption practices. However, the attention on the ordinary runs the risk of obscuring the contribution of the ‘extraordinary’ or the transcendental to (...) the ethical concerns embedded in the mundane flow of the everyday. This study addresses this blind spot and explores the ways in which religion is implicated in everyday consumption ethics. In doing so, I go beyond a view of religion as an individual trait and emphasize its role as a major institutional structure of the contemporary political economy. The empirical context of the study is the controversy over the so-called halal nail polish. The debate over the products’ appropriateness for Muslim women provides a fertile setting to explore how an ordinary object becomes an ethical problem amid changing relations between religion and market. In order to trace and analyse the linkages between daily practices and institutional dynamics I draw from the moral economy framework and discuss the multiple and conflicting moral repertoires that shape the ethical evaluations of the object. The study offers several contributions to the existing theorizations of everyday consumption ethics and moral economies of consumption. It also highlights the potential of interdisciplinary approaches in providing a holistic understanding of the ethical and moral dimensions of consumption. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to bring Ragin’s recent methodological contributions, which build on ideas borrowed from fuzzy logic, to the attention of management scholars. To demonstrate the possible use of the techniques developed by Ragin in management research, three specific examples for their likely applications are presented: the replications of Porter’s diamond framework for Turkey, Greece and Canada. The article concludes that Ragin’s systematic techniques prove helpful in making explicit the process of comparing qualitative evidence derived from (...) case study research, and thus they deserve greater attention in the management literature. (shrink)

Nietzsche is not known for his theory of empathy. A quick skimming of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on empathy demonstrates this. Arthur Schopenhauer, Robert Vischer, and Theodor Lipps are among those whose views are considered representative, but Nietzsche has been simply forgotten in discussion of empathy. Nietzsche’s theory of empathy has not yet aroused sufficient interest among commentators. I believe that his views on this subject merit careful consideration. Nietzsche scholars have been interested in his naturalistic accounts of (...) other phenomena, but there seems to be relatively limited interest in his naturalistic account of a phenomenon that is so central to his disagreement with Schopenhauer, namely, empathic concern for others. This is surprising because Nietzsche makes a valuable contribution; he has views more in keeping with contemporary theories of empathy than others of his time. My goal here is to fill in this gap in the scholarship and provide the first thorough analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of empathy, which appears most clearly in Dawn. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence and robotics is pervasive in daily life and set to expand to new levels potentially replacing human decision-making and action. Self-driving cars, home and healthcare robots, and autonomous weapons are some examples. A distinction appears to be emerging between potentially benevolent civilian uses of the technology (eg unmanned aerial vehicles delivering medicines), and potentially malevolent military uses (eg lethal autonomous weapons killing human com- batants). Machine-mediated human interaction challenges the philosophical basis of human existence and ethical conduct. Aside (...) from technical challenges of ensuring ethical conduct in artificial intelligence and robotics, there are moral questions about the desirability of replacing human functions and the human mind with such technology. How will artificial intelligence and robotics engage in moral reasoning in order to act ethically? Is there a need for a new set of moral rules? What happens to human interaction when it is mediated by technology? Should such technology be used to end human life? Who bears responsibility for wrongdoing or harmful conduct by artificial intelligence and robotics? -/- Whilst Kant may be familiar to international lawyers for setting restraints on the use of force and rules for perpetual peace, his foundational work on ethics provides an inclusive moral philosophy for assessing ethical conduct of individuals and states and, thus, is relevant to discussions on the use and development of artificial intelligence and robotics. His philosophy is inclusive because it incorporates justifications for morals and legitimate responses to immoral conduct, and applies to all human agents irrespective of whether they are wrongdoers, unlawful combatants, or unjust enemies. Humans are at the centre of rational thinking, action, and norm-creation so that the rationale for restraints on methods and means of warfare, for example, is based on preserving human dignity as well as ensuring conditions for perpetual peace among states. Unlike utilitarian arguments which favour use of autonomous weapons on the basis of cost-benefit reasoning or the potential to save lives, Kantian ethics establish non-consequentialist and deontological rules which are good in themselves to follow and not dependent on expediency or achieving a greater public good. -/- Kantian ethics make two distinct contributions to the debate. First, they provide a human-centric ethical framework whereby human exist- ence and capacity are at the centre of a norm-creating moral philosophy guiding our understanding of moral conduct. Second, the ultimate aim of Kantian ethics is practical philosophy that is relevant and applicable to achieving moral conduct. -/- I will seek to address the moral questions outlined above by exploring how core elements of Kantian ethics relate to use of artificial intelli- gence and robotics in the civilian and military spheres. Section 2 sets out and examines core elements of Kantian ethics: the categorical imperative; autonomy of the will; rational beings and rational thinking capacity; and human dignity and humanity as an end in itself. Sections 3-7 consider how these core elements apply to artificial intelligence and robotics with discussion of fully autonomous and human-machine rule-generating approaches; types of moral reasoning; the difference be- tween ‘human will’ and ‘machine will’; and respecting human dignity. (shrink)

This essay argues for the importance of an organismic perspective in plant biology and considers some of its implications. These include an increased attention to plant-environment interaction and an emphasis on integrated approaches. Furthermore, this essay contextualizes the increased emphasis on the concept of organism in recent years and places the concept in a longer history. Recent developments in biology and worsening environmental crises have led researchers to study plant responses to changing environments with whole plant approaches that situate plants (...) in their environments, emphasizing the intricate and dynamic interaction between them. This renewed attention to the organism recalls the debates of the early twentieth century, when organicism was one of the three main frameworks in biology (along with vitalism and mechanism). Some scholars see this renewed importance today as a “return” of this earlier period. This essay argues that including insights from plant biology will benefit philosophy of biology research that examines the concept of organism and organicism now and in earlier periods. A comprehensive account of the concept of organism should involve a botanical conception of the organism as well as a zoological one (which is more frequently considered). Although this essay does not aim to present a conceptual analysis, it presents examples of how an organismic perspective can be useful for understanding concepts (such as phenotype, stress, etc.) and research processes (such as experiment set-ups, data processes, etc.) in plant biology. Philosophy of biology investigations that aim at a comprehensive understanding of the concept of organism can benefit greatly from examinations of cases in plant biology, both now and in the past. (shrink)

Çevre sorunlarının katlanarak arttığı ve biyoloji biliminin büyük sıçramalarla geliştiği günümüzde organizma kavramının incelenmesi, hem kendi doğamızı (dolayısıyla da diğer canlılarla etkileşimlerimizi) hem de günümüz biyolojisindeki değişimleri daha iyi anlayabilmemiz için faydalı olacaktır. Bu çalışma, organizma kavramını özellikle organizma-çevre etkileşimi üzerinden inceleyerek günümüz biyolojisindeki önemini vurgulayacaktır. Organizma kavramı özellikle Modern Sentezden, Genişletilmiş Evrimsel Senteze geçişle birlikte ayrı bir önem kazanmıştır. Köklerini yirminci yüzyılın başlarındaki organizma-merkezci biyolojiden alan bu kavramın gelişimi, son birkaç on yıldır biyoloji biliminde gerçekleşmiş olan gelişmelerle (özellikle gelişim (...) biyolojisi, sistem biyolojisi ve ekoloji dallarında) iyice dinamikleşmiştir. Organizma kavramının gelişimini incelemek sadece biyoloji biliminin felsefesi açısından değil, bunun yanında, insan olarak kendi biyolojik varlığımızı -organizma- ve çevremizle (hem abiyotik hem de biyotik) olan etkileşimlerimizi, tekrar düşünmek açısından değerlidir. (shrink)

Yakın zamana kadar dominant olan Newtoncu doğa anlayışı doğa bilimlerindeki gelişmelerle ciddi olarak eleştirilmeye başlanmıştır. Hiç kuşku yok ki bu eleştirel dönüşüm sürecinin başlangıcında Einstein ve Schrödinger fiziği vardır. Buna bağlı olarak biyolojide geçtiğimiz yüzyılın başından günümüze kadar gerçekleşen gelişmeler (evrimsel biyoloji, genetik, epigenetik, moleküler biyoloji, gelişim biyolojisi, ekoloji, fizyoloji konularıyla ilgili değişim ve gelişimler) biyolojinin temel kavramları olan fenom, genom ve çevre’deki değişimleri de içermektedir. Yeni bir doğa kavrayışını da beraberinde getiren bu süreçte biyoloji, bize canlıların çevreleriyle sınırları net (...) olmayan ve kompleks etkileşimleri üzerinden kendilerini dinamik bir halde sürekli olarak organize eden sistemler olduğunu söylemektedir. Canlıların, değişimini gözlemleyebileceğimiz kadar hızlı olan özellikleri de uzun süreler boyunca stabil halde gözlemlediğimiz özellikleri de süreçlerden oluşmaktadır. Canlılara ait tüm özellikler (fenomlar ve genomlar) kompleks bir ağ oluşturan diğer akışlarla etkileşimleri içinde akmaktadır. Bu yüzden, bir fenotipik özelliği etraflıca açıklama iddiasıyla yola çıkılıp, buna rağmen araştırmanın ve sonucundaki açıklamanın tek yönlü (sadece tek bir tür parametreyi dikkate alarak ve bir parametreye özellikle yoğun vurgu yaparak) yapılması sorunludur. Çünkü fenom, ancak bütüncül bir yaklaşımla ve fenom oluşumunun kompleksite ve dinamizm özelliklerinin farkında olarak etraflıca açıklanabilir. Bir fenotipik özelliğin etraflıca açıklanması iddiasının olmadığı durumlarda (ki standart bir biyoloji araştırması çoğunlukla bu iddiada değildir), sadece bir parametre dikkate alınabilir ve bu durum son derece anlaşılırdır. Bilim insanları her durumda (fenotipik özelliği hem etraflıca inceleme hem de tek bir parametreyle etkileşimini inceleme durumlarında) fenom oluşumunun kompleksite ve dinamizm özelliklerinin farkında olmalıdırlar ve açıklamaları da araştırma süreçleri de bu farkındalığı içermelidir. Burada araştırmacının zihnini belirleyen soru şudur: doğa bütünsel, stabil ve mekanik nedenselliğin egemen olduğu bir varlıklar alanı mıdır yoksa parçaların birbirleriyle sürekli etkileşerek yeni uyumlar ve ilişkiler geliştirdiği karmaşık ve akışkan varlıklar topluluğu mudur? Bu soruya karmaşıklık, akışkanlık, karşılıklı etkileşim ve uyum üzerinden cevap verilirse üzerine odaklanılacak olan kavram ne varlık ne fenomen, fakat süreçtir. Nitekim süreç felsefesi, biyolojideki felsefi problemler ve kavramsal incelemeler için çok kullanışlıdır. Bu durumun iki temel nedeni: 1) biyolojinin konusu olan şeylerin temel olarak süreçler olması ve 2) bilim insanlarının araştırmaları sırasında süreçler üzerinden akıl yürütmeleri ve bu yolla kavramları kullanmaları, açıklamalara, bilgiye ulaşmalarıdır. Bu çalışma, bu iki temel unsuru göz önünde bulundurarak ortaya çıkan yeni biyolojinin beraberinde getirdiği ve yeni imkanlar sunan yeni bir doğa anlayışına odaklanmıştır. Bu yeni doğa anlayışı, mekanik ve statik olmaktan ziyade kendi içinde stabil ama bütünüyle dinamik doğa anlayışıdır. (shrink)

The model companion of the theory of fields with valuation and automorphism exists. A counterexample shows that the theory of models of ACFA equipped with valuation is not this model companion.

The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to expose Friedrich Nietzsche’s critically neglected account of empathic concern. In what follows, I will briefly present the main ideas and purpose of the project, and include necessary background. -/- Since a significant portion of Nietzsche’s work on moral psychology and ethics is directed toward naturalizing and conceptually redefining the metaphysical implications of Arthur Schopenhauer’s account of compassion, I begin by critically examining Schopenhauer’s metaphysics. At its simplest, Schopenhauer’s narrative goes as follows: the (...) phenomenal world is determined and driven by a metaphysical striving and yearning (more clearly, a will-to-live) that can never be satisfied. We have access to this underlying reality of existence, i.e., the thing-in-itself, subjectively, in the inner awareness which we have of our own experience of willing. -/- Unfortunately, the subtleties and nuances of Schopenhauer’s understanding of inner awareness and its centrality within his overall oeuvre have generally been overlooked or underappreciated by scholars. I suspect that the main reason for this problem is that there does not seem to be an adequate account of the relation between representation and willing in Schopenhauer’s system. I offer an in-depth analysis of Schopenhauer’s understanding of inner awareness, as well as demonstrate its significance as the essential precursor to self-knowledge and world-understanding. -/- The thing-in-itself, a term Schopenhauer borrows from Immanuel Kant, signifies a fundamental reality that underlies the apparent diversity and change in the world, a reality that is distinct from what is merely temporal or changeable. Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will has been deeply problematic and puzzling to commentators, because willing and striving is temporal, and no temporal phenomenon can be identical to the thing-in-itself. I distinguish between three distinct views that Schopenhauer formulates about the thing-in-itself, and suggest to understand these three accounts as contrasting but not contradictory views, in other words as different perspectives on the same reality. -/- Next, I examine the theory of empathy that Nietzsche presents in his book, Daybreak, as an alternative to Schopenhauer’s account of compassion, which is solely based on his metaphysics of the will. For Schopenhauer, compassion is associated with an instinctual recognition that beneath our apparent separateness as individuals, we are in fact the expression of the same metaphysical will. Nietzsche moves away from this metaphysical conception and calls, instead, for a naturalistic account in which empathy relies on a sense of psychological closeness and perceived similarity to others, which then results in a feeling of oneness between individuals. Yet, for Nietzsche, this feeling of oneness manifests itself as a sense of being in solidarity with others who share similar experiences, while still recognizing one another’s numerical distinctiveness. -/- Finally, I examine Nietzsche’s assessment of the value of compassion. Nietzsche seems to be critical of all compassion but at times also seems to praise a different form of compassion, which he refers to as ‘our compassion’ and contrasts it with ‘your compassion’. Some commentators have interpreted this to mean that Nietzsche’s criticism is not as unconditional as it may seem–that he does not condemn compassion entirely. I disagree and contend that even though Nietzsche appears to speak favorably of some forms of compassion, he regards all compassion as fundamentally bad. I argue that, for Nietzsche, ‘our compassion’, however regrettable qua compassion it is, may give occasion for a rare and peculiar insight into ‘co-suffering’ with others, which in turn results in overcoming compassion entirely. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility is often framed in terms of opposing constructions of the firm. These reflect, respectively, different accounts of its obligations: either to shareholders or to stakeholders. Although these opposing constructions of corporate responsibility are diametrically opposed, they are also much more fluid and mobile in certain contexts, since they can act as discursive resources that are deployed and brought into play in the struggle over shaping what responsibility means. They are less the fixed, ideological “signposts” they might appear, (...) and more like “weathervanes” that move alongside changing rhetorical currents. To show this, we analyse the Securities and Exchange Commission consultation process, and legislation, relating to the provenance of “conflict minerals”. We identify two dialectically opposed camps, each seeking to influence final legislation and with end goals in keeping with the shareholder/stakeholder dichotomy. One camp lobbied for firms to scrutinize their entire supply chain, constructing the firm as a “global citizen” with very wide social responsibilities. The second camp lobbied for a lighter touch approach, constructing the firm as a “trader”, with much narrower social responsibilities. We analyse the complex interplay between these two opposed camps, our contribution being to show how both deploy competing conceptions of the corporation as discursive resources. (shrink)

I argue against a prevailing interpretation of Schopenhauer’s account of inner awareness and world-understanding. Because scholars have typically taken on board the assumption that inner awareness is non-representational, they have concerned themselves in the main with how to transfer this immediate cognition of will in ourselves and apply it to our understanding of the world–as–representation. Some scholars propose that the relation of the world-as-will to the world-as-representation is to be understood in figurative or metaphorical terms. I disagree because, for Schopenhauer, (...) inner awareness reveals a genuine philosophical truth. Some scholars also suggest that it is only via analogical transference that one can interpret the world as having the same inner nature as oneself. I disagree and point out the downside of this suggestion. I use both textual evidence and general philosophical considerations to demonstrate that inner awareness, for Schopenhauer, has a representational dimension. Overlooking this point has led scholars to misconstrue how inner awareness relates to world-understanding. I provide an alternative interpretation against figurative and analogical readings. I propose that, for Schopenhauer, we cognize partially a priori that all things are merely different expressions of the same activity that we are acquainted with in inner awareness. (shrink)

The Scottish historical novelist, John Galt assumed that the origins of law rested on the anarchistic and primitive nature of human beings, who formed a society on a contractual basis out of the need for security. Although generally agreeing with enlightenment thinkers on the formation of society, law and human nature a divergence in Galt's thought appeared in the secular treatment of crimes. Adhering to prevalent Christian notions about sin and crime, Galt rejected a clear distinction between the two, and (...) between morality and law, such as were upheld by such enlightenment figures as Cesare Beccaria. Such a clear distinction failed in its analysis of the phenomena. He was at one with Enlightenment-influenced thought in its criticism of cruel punishments and advocated a humanitarian approach to the criminal, but he also emphasised education in Christian morality as the most appropriate means of deterrence. This divergence from more radical enlightenment views sprang from his lack of confidence in the capacities of human reason. Nevertheless, a fundamentally humanist philosophy and a belief in the importance of learning linked his conservatism with an enlightenment belief in human progress. (shrink)

We study the automorphism group of the algebraic closure of a substructure A of a pseudofinite field F. We show that the behavior of this group, even when A is large, depends essentially on the roots of unity in F. For almost all completions of the theory of pseudofinite fields, we show that over A, algebraic closure agrees with definable closure, as soon as A contains the relative algebraic closure of the prime field.